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IAn analysis of the PNGS and AGS guidance failures and their effect on
the powered descent trajectory has been made. The critical failures
have been iderxtified and the probability of their detection by the
crew determined. Failed system isolation using the MSPV and landing
radar is discussed. Finally, two possible methods for monitoring
the onboard guidance systems are discussed and evaluated.
INTRODUCTION
The present IM strategy requires tH,-o LM to be controlled automatically
by the guidance throughout almost 	 entire descent to the lunar surface.
While the crew does not exercise spacecraft control until late in the
`.	 descent, they can monitor the trajectory through the primary (PNGS) and
abort (AGS) guidance systems in conjunction with navigational data
received from the manned space flight network (MSFN) data.
Among the functions the crew performs during the descent is that of
detecting and isolating guidance failures before a safe abort is no
longer possible. Some measure of confidence that the systems are
operating satisfactorily can be achieved by comparing the trajectories
^$	 computed by the PNGS and AGS. In addition, monitoring of the trajec-
tor!,es can provide failure detection, but identification of the failed
system is not always possible. The studies of references 1 and 2
indicate that differencing of parameters of the two systems also provides
failure identification, but as before, the technique does not provide
failed system isolation. In both cases, some other system must be used
;^.	 to positively identify the failed system.
The present study is directed toward the problems involved in the
monitoring of guidance systems and the detection and isolation of
failed systems during the LM descent to the lunar surface. The
report examines monitoring concepts, identifies critical failures
and their probability of detection by the crew. Finally, two
techniques for providing the onboard monitoring requirements are
evaluated.
DESCENT TRAJETORY
The LM descent trajectory is divided into a braking phase, a final
approach phase, and a landing phase. The braking phase, which starts
at 50,000 feet pericynthion altitude and ends at a high gate altitude
of the order of 9,000 feet, is a near fuel-optimum trajectory. The
final approach starts at hi-gate and is designed to provide the crew
visibility of the landing site and sufficient time to assess the
landing area. The landing phase begins at a low gate altitude of
the order of 500 feet approximately 1000 feet from the landing site.
The phase is designed to afford the crew time to make a close-in
assessment of the landing site with a trajectory easy to control.
2GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Control of the LM is through the primary navigation and guidance system
(PNGS). Backing up the PNGS for aborts following any PNGS failure is
the abort guidance system (AGS). In addition, the MSFN is able to
track the LM and provide certain navigational data.
Primary Guidance System
The main elements of the PNGS are the guidance computer (LGo, the
Inertial measurin unit (DO), the display and keyboard (DSKY3, the
landing radar (al, and the rendezvous radar (RR) or optical tracker
(LOBS). The LGC, IMU, and DSKY function as a unit, but the LR and
RR have the capability to operate independently of the other equipment.
The PNGS computes the descent guidance steering commands throughou
the descent maneuver. The PNGS is initialized from lunar orbit
navigation data processed onboard or obtained from the MSFN prior
to separation and reclined before the start of the descent burn.
The PNGS operates as a pure inertial system to an altitude of the
order of 25,000 feet. At this altitude, the landing radar measurement
of altitude is combined with PNGS estimate of altitude to begin
correcting the inertial drifts to wash out terrain altitude uncertain-
ties. To prevent large transients in PNGS operation in the event of
significant differences between the two altitudes, the LR -altitude is
weighted at a ratio of 0.1 with the PNGS altitude at the first update.
The LR altitude weighting is increased from 0.1 to 0.55 at an altitude
of the order of 15,000 feet where it remains for the remainder of the
landing maneuver. The update of PNGS velocity by the LR begins at an
altitude of about 15,000 feet with a weight of 0.1 increasing to 0.4
at an altitude of the order of 5,000 feet.
Abort Guidance System
The primary elements of the AGS are the abort sensor assembly (ASA), the
abort electronics (AEA), and the DEDA. The AGS is initialized by the
PNGS Just prior to the descent burn and provides backup ascent guidance
for abort following PNGS failure. The AGS does not provide descent
guidance, but it can compute and display various trajectory parameters
on the flight instruments or DEDA.
3Manned Space Flight Network
The discussion of reference 3 indicates the determination of the IM state
vector from MM observations is relatively poor. The position and velocity
are determined to a 3 O' accuracy of 10 n. mi. and 120 ft/sec, respectively,
with the errors being very nearly equally distributed in height, downrange,
and crossrange. However, the MSFK measurement of R (doppler or velocity
along the station-LM line of sight) is quite good with a 3 (')" error of about
1.5 ft/sec. The MSFN data are not processed through a statistical filter
but are simply subjected to coordinate transformation and smoothing. Thus,
the information delay is essentially that of transmission, perhaps of the
order of three seconds.
GUIDANCE FAILURE MODES
Both the PNGS and AGS are subject to a number of failures that either
cause a complete disruption of the output or so seriously degrade their
performance they are of no further use for controlling the spacecraft.
Ma.iy of the failures that the onboard guidance systems are subject to
are detected automatically, and the crew is informed of these failures
through caution and warning devices. Among these are the two guidance
computers (LGC, AEA) which contain: self-checks for failure detection,
electrical power supplies, engine .rim gimbals, RAS jets, and others.
Failures of this type will be detected by the crew without difficulty.
Failure Types
In general, the failures t!,.at are of concern in monitoring can be
grouped into one of two categories: (1) „hard-over" and (2) slowly
deteriorating. Hard-over failures, such as a gyro, cause fairly
rapid deviations from the expected spacecraft performance. Such
failures generally cannot endanger the crew because the slow attitude
and translational characteristics of the LM during descent allow the
crew time to assess the failure and take corrective action. The
failures in the second category are more difficult for the crew to
detect because they result only Im relatively slow divergence from
the normally expected conditions. While this type of failure creates
no immediate danger to the crew, allowing it to persist will ultimately
drive the spacecraft into flight conditions which reduce the possibility
of safe abort. However, as these failures must also exist for extensive
periods of time, thy. crew is afforded a reasonable amoung of time for
detection of the failure.
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Primary Failure Sources
From a guidance viewpoint, the primary area of failures that affect the
trajectory arise from inertial measuring component characteristics. In
the IM, the equipment subject to these failures are the IMU (PNGS) and
the ASA (AGS). The characteristics of major importance are gyro drifts,
accelerometer biases, component misalinements, and other items such as
mass unbalance and nonlinearities of the gyros and accelerometers.
Effect of Failures on PNGS and AGS Trajectories
The primary sources of the failures affecting trajectory computations
arise from failed or partially failed IMU or ASA accelerometers and
gyros. To determine the effect of these failures on the trajectories
computed by the PNGS and AGS, the presently expected 1(7r accelerometer
and gyro errors were inserted into the descent trajectory program. The
deviations in the PNGS and AGS positions and velocities were then
determined assuming a final inertial alinement five minutes prior to
the start of descent burn. Error propagation was terminated at
430 seconds into the descent burn, corresponding to a hi-gate alti-
tude of the order of $,600 feet. From this, the magnitude of the
deviations required to cause the Iii to penetrate the deadman's curve
were determined assuming that linear analysis techniques were valid.
The actual IMU and ASA errors used in the analysis were:
(1) accelerometer bias, scale factor, scale factor nonlinearity,
misalinement, and cross-axis sensitivity, (2) initial platform
misalinement, and (3) gyro drift, mass unbalance, and anisoelasticity.
The data from the linear analysis provided the expected 1,^'' deviations
about the descent trajectory for both the PNGS and AGS as a function of
time into the descent burn (figure 1).
FAILURE DETECTION TEOHNIQUES
A check on PNGS performance can be obtained by using the PNGS and AGS
estimates of the trajectory in at least two ways: (1) monitoring
trajectory* bounds or (2) differencing selected PNGS and AGS trajectory
variables.
Failure Detection by Reference Trajectory Monitoring
In reference trajectory monitoring, the expected deviations of each
system from the reference trajectory are determined as a function of
time from final update or time into descent burn. The two bounds of
selected parameters of each system can be checked at specified
Intervals of time. As long as the two guidance systems agree, there
ris a high probability that both systems are working. (There is a certain
probability that both systems have almost identical failures in which case
both trajectories would be wrong but agree.) On the other hand, if the
expected limits of either system are exceeded, there iv a high probability
that a failure of some type has occurred, and the crew must decide which
system has failed. The decision as to which one has failed is not
altogether easy for the trajectory bounds do not provide an immediate
answer. Assume, for example, thaw the AGS limits have been exceeded
and that the PNGS is within the expected limits. On the surface, itw	
would appear that the AGS had failed because the PNGS is on trajectory
•	 whereas the AGS is not. Remember, though, that 'the PNGS is insensitive
to IMU errors and that the LGC accepts the IM outputs as being correct
and computes the trajectory based on the available sensor outputs. That
is, the trajectory is adjusted to meet the sensor data. Hence, even
though the AGS trajectory is out of limits, it can be indicating a
PNGS failure.
r
Failure Detection by PNGS-AGS Trajectory Differencing
Failure detection can also be performed by using the difference between
the PNGS and AGS trajectory parameters (reference 1). In this technique,
the expected 3 0 differences (or any other desired difference level) of
PNGS and AGS trajectory parameters are precalculated and plotted on
charts as a function of time from the start of descent burn. For
failure detection, the PNGS/AGS difference is determined at specific
time intervals during the descent and compared to the expected 37
difference for that time. If the difference is within the 3 T bounds,
both systems are assumed to be functioning correctly; if the difference
exceeds the 3(7 difference, one of the two systems is assumed failed.
For the latter event, the crew still has the problem of determining
which one has failed.
GUIDANCE SYSTEM FAILURE ISOLATION
Regardless of the type of failure detection technique employed, the use
of only two systems does not provide a positive identification of the
failed system. In the case of the LM, three systems are available for
this purpose: (1) landing radar, (2) rendezvous radar, and (3) MSFN.
The landing radar should provide a useful measure of altitude after
some 200 seconds into the descent burn and altitude rate data some
x	 100 seconds later (reference 4)? The rendezvous radar provides usable
CSM-LM relative range and range-rate data throughout most of the braking
phase. MSFN tracking data of primary significance are velocities, in
particular range rate between the LM and earth-based MSFN tracking
stations. Note, however, that once the PNGS has been updated by the
landing radar, the two systems are no longer independent, and the radar
cannot (rather should not) be used for failure isolation thereafter.
rF
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Isolation of Failed System
Once it has been established that a guidance system has failed, the
procedures for isolation are straightfox"4ard. 	 The use of the three
systems let
Landing Radar - The landing radar measurement of altitude can be compared
directly with the PNGS and AGS estimates of altitude following the detec-
tion of a failure. 	 The primary disadvantage Is that the terrain altitude
uncertainty may require an extremely large difference to exist between
the two systems before a positive identification can be made.	 Later on
in the descent burn, the measurement of altitude rate can be used for a
• direct check of PNGS and AGS altitude rate estimates  which gives a
fairly quick isolation check as only the radar velocity uncertainties
must be considered.
r.
Rendezvous Radar - The rendezvous radar measurement of range-rate must
be compared against a chart showing expected time history of range rate
as the LGC and AEA do not compute this variable.	 Following a failure,
it must be assumed that the PNGS has failed if the RR measure of range
rate does not agree with the chart and AGS failed if the measured
range rate agrees with the cart. 	 The system can be used during the
entire braking phase.
r MSFN - As in the case of the RR, the MSFN measurement of station-LM range
rate must be compared to a chart showing the nominally expected range rate
for the particular landing site as neither the LGC or AEA have programs
to compute this.
	 From the viewpoint of crew operations, it would be better
to compare altitude rate directly, but the expected velocity uncertainty
along the moon radius vector and IM almost precludes this. 	 However, as
the station-IM range rate is well defined for a specified pericynthion
and subsequent powered descent trajectory, the use of station-TES range
rate provides a sufficient means of failure isolation.	 Use of range rate
following a failure requires that the MSFN measurement be compared to a
chart showing a time history of expected range rate for the given landing
site.	 If the MSFN measurement agrees with the expected range rate, the
AGS is assumed to be failed.
	 Should the MSFN measurement disagree with
the expected range rate, the crew must assume the PNGS has failed.
r RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Providing a scheme for the detection and isolation of failures requires
a knowledge of the effect of various failures on the PNGS and AGS and
It the magnitude of failures that can be detected.	 Because the guidance
monitoring is based on maximizing the probability of safe abort, the
failures of primary concern are those having the ,greatest effecton
altitude and altitude rate.
	 In particular, it is necessary to deter-
mine the magnitude of the failures that cause the LM to penetrate: the
deadman's curve and to establish the probability of their detection by
the crew.
7Trajectory Deviations Required to Penetrate Deadman l s Curve
The deviations in altitude, altitude rate, and lateral velocity arise
principally from X and Z-axis accelerometer bias, X-axis and X Y cross-axis
accelerometer misalinemen's, and X- and Y-axis gyro drifts. To obtain
the trajectory deviations causing penetration of the deadman's curve,
these errors were added linearly to the reference trajectory. Figure 2
contains the altitude-altitude rate profile of the normal descent plus
deadman's curves for T/W ratios of 0.35 and 0.55 (roughly the expected
ratios for the descent engine in the region of ,interest). The PNGS
deviations from the normal trajectory were then extended at various
intervals of time to hi-gate until they passed through the two deadman's
curves. The multiple of 1Cr deviations required to penetrate were then
determined and have been plotted in figure 3. This figure indicates that
the region of principle interest lies between 300 and 430 seconds into
the descent burn. Figure 3 shows that penetration will occur only for
60 1"" trajectory deviations that have existed for some 300 seconds (600
seconds after final alinement) and that deviations of the order of 10 'Y
must exist nearly 430 seconds to cause penetration. Also, notice the
relative insensitivity of T/W to deadman's curve penetration, at least
for the range of T/W considFred here. For practical considerations,
errors in the trajectory of the order of 60 C are not likely to exist
unless something is radically wrong with either the spacecrafr or
guidance system. The lower deviations causing penetration of the deadman's
curve near 430 seconds are reasonable but still represent highly degraded
guidance operation.
The magnitude of the individual errors required to drive the LM into
the deadman's curve can be calculated using the formula:
2	 1 +	 (K Q' - 1) ^M(t)2KX(1)
vJ
where	 KX is the number of 1Cr of the error source required for
deadman curve penetration
Kcr is the multiple of 1(:^' trajectory deviations of the combined
error sources causing deadman curve penetration
O-M(t) is the normal 1(75 trajectory deviation at time t
ME(t) is the normal 1CY error ,source contribution to C^(t) at time t
Using the information f^'om figures 1, 2, and 3, the values for KX for the
PNGS were calculated and have been tabulated in table 1.
F.0
a
Kx (C)
Z-axia
acael.
X-axis
accel.
_, -
cross
axis
Y-axis
misaline
s
gyro drift
Time KC- h h
300 60 242 67 403 202 703 600
350 30 101 34 200 100 333 277
420 $•5 27 9.3 54 277 87 71
Table 1 - Size of failure for deadman curve penetration
Probability of Crew Detecting Errors
After determining the magnitude of the errors that cause penetration of
the deadmwi l s boundary, it is necessary to determine the level of the
component errors the crew is able to detect. 'While the effort in this
report is basically aimed at detecting errors causing penetration of
the deadman $ s curve ,$
 it should be apparent that the same principle can
be applied to the other trajectory variables. However, a complete
analysis of the entire trajectory is beyond the scope of this effort,
and from the viewpoint of providing safe aborts, not expressly required.
Theory of Detection - The principle effect of errors in the IMU and ASA
is to cause an off-nominal trajectory. This off nominal tra j ector7 will,
at some time, exceed the expected normal 3 (r boucdary. low, if only
the error source is considered, once the mean error ,forces the normal
3 (,'^," boundary deviation to be exceeded, the crew would have an indication
of failure by time S as shown on the figure A below.
_	 Trajectory
Variable
Magnitude
Distribution of other
error sources
o
.1 cr
-20"
^^.._	 1
	
Normal j
•..,	 deviation
Mean deviation
of error sources	
Normal (mean)
i	 traj e►ctory variable
t 1 	 t2
TIME -^
Figure A = Determination of Probability of Detecting Errors
F9
However, the statistical properties of the remaining error sources cause
a Gaussian distribution about the new trajectory. Because of this, the
actual trajectory is equally likely to be above or below the mean. Hence,
there is exactly a 50% chance of detecting the error at t1. Now if the
trajectory in allowed to deviate further, the chance of detection increases
accordingly. At t2 in the above figure, the trajectory has deviated to the
point where the distribution about the mean lies at the -3'1 point of the
remaining error sources. Hence, the crew at this time has a 99.86% chance
of detecting the failure. Thus, it can be seen that a correct statistical
combination of all error sources allows the 99.86% (or any other level of
probability of detection) detection level to be calculated. As shown in
As shown in reference 1, the 99.86% level can be determined using the
equations
M (t) = 3 Q'M (t) +	 0-M(t ) 2- `'MEW	 +(2)
where
	
	
m(t) - mean value required for 99.86,$ detection level and ^M(t)
and CYME(t) are as defined previously
Because m(t) = K%F, (t) and (:rME(t) is a function of the normal 1C7 IM
or ASA errors, the magnitude of component error required for a 99.86%
detection level is readily determinedo This assumes, of course, that
the linear analysis holds for large trajectory and component deviations.
a nitride of Comyonent Failures for 99 .86% Detection Level - Using the
numerical values associated with the individual PNGS and AGS component
failures in equation (2) yields the results shown in tables 2 and 5.
The table Indicates the size of a failure yielding a 0.9986 probability
of detection remains essentially constant thro hout the descent for all
failures examined (except for Y-axis gyro drift). As was the case in
the size of PNGS failures causing penetration of the deadman's curve,
the failures for 0.9986 probability of detection level correspond to
essentially complete failures except for PNGS and AGS X-axis accelerometer
bias and Y-axis accelerometer misalinement. The monitoring of Y, as shown
in table 3, will pick up an X-axis accelerometer bias failure in either
the PNGS or JIGS at approximately the same time as the monitoring of h and
E. Also, relatively low level failures in AGS X-axis misalinement can be
detected early, but an X-axis gyro must essentially fail before there is
a high probability of detection.
r
-Op
F.
10
m 	 (a)
Z-axis Accel.
Bias
X-axis Accel,
Bi is
Acce .Cross-
saline
X-axis Accel.
M10 Zing
Y-axis
gIZ2 Drift
TIME PNGS AGS PNGS AGS
jEt
NGS AGS PNGS ACTS PIGS	 AGS
100 20.7 29.8 4.7 8.3 43 17.5 21.1 7.4 1 21 20
200 22.6 30 4.8 8.7 42 17 21.0 7.3 78 78 18 1
300 19.7 29.8 4.9 9.0 40 16.3 18.5 7.2 69
400 19.3 30 5.0 9.3 39 17 18.7 7.2 62E52M13
Table 2 - PNGS and AGS Failure Magnitudes for a Detection Level of 99.86% Using
h and N
m 
Y-axis Accel.,
Bias
X-Axis Accel,
Misalinement
X-axis Gyro
Drift
PNGS AGS PNGS AGS
r
PNGS AGS
Time
(sec)
100 4.3 8.7 19.4 7.1 78 19.1
200 4.5 9.4 18 7.1 63 16.3
300 4.7 10.1 16.9 7.1 52 '703
400 4.1 11.5 14.5 6.9 40 12.3
Table 3 - Mapitude of Failure for 92.86% Detection
Probability by Monitoring Y
r
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Ma=-of Safety in Failure Detection, - There is Initially a considerable
margin of safety in detecting the errors resulting in penetration of the
deadman's curve. This is shown quite clearly in figure B which shows the
two curves for an X-axis accelerometer bias error. At 300 seconds into
the burn, it requires roughly an error 15 times greater than the error
required for 99.86% level of detection to drive the IM into the deadman's
curve. The ratio decreases to 3:1 at 400 seconds and to 2:1 at 430
seconds, which is still a comfortable safety margin. It must be noted
that both these curves were calculated assuming no update of the PNGS
with the landing radar. Hence, till curve is optimistic in that a much
larger error is required for detection. However, the error required to
cause penetration of the deadman's curve is also greater so that the
margin should not be radically changed, but the detailed analysis
necessary to determine the exact effect is beyond the scope of this
present effort.
80.7
Accelerometer Bias 	 ^-
Necessary for
Penetration of
Deadman's Curve
Error
Magnitude
40
20 Cr
-- Accelerometer Bias Required
for 99.86% Detection Probability
100	 200
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	 1400	 500
Time (Sec)
-01
0
0
Figure B - Margin of Safety for Irror Detection
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Error Analysis Summary
The linear error analysis and the discussion of error detection reveal
two primary items of interest to guidance monitoring--(1) the trajectory
deviations required to cause penetration of the deadman's curve are large
except in the region below high gate, and (2) except for isolated cases,
the magnitude of a failure that will assure a high level of detection
essentially constitutes complete disruption of component function. From
the viewpoint of being able to effect a safe abort, it would appear that
the dynamic characteri:-itics of the LM preclude anything but a gradual
penetration of the deadman's curve. Late in the descent, the picture
changes slightly in that smaller deviations affect the safe abort
possibilities, but the penetration is still gradual, and the detection
probability high. From a monitoring viewpoint, the low dynamic character-
istics of the LM coupled with the excessive trajectory deviations necessary
to penetrate the deadman's curve means the crew has a relatively long time
to assess the guidance operation before dangerous flight conditions are
reached. The second fact; indicates the crew has an extremely high
probability of detecting any and all failures that lead to unsafe
abort conditions. Further, while some failures may not have a high
detection probability, neither do they radically affect the trajectory
and consequently offer little danger to the crew. For these reasons,
It makes very little difference whether the trajectory is monitored
or PNGS-AGS differencing is used for failure detection. Both provide
the same end results with about the same amount of effort on the part
of the crew as is indicated in the following discussion.
Reference Trajectory Monitoring
In the trajectory monitoring scheme, the crew periodically examines
selected trajectory variables to determine whether they be within
their expected bounds. The crew does not perform failure isolation
checks unless one of the variables being monitored falls outside its
limit. The variables selected for monitoring are contained in table 4;
a possible time line of events is given in table 5 for the entire
descent.
Braking Phase Monitoring - During the braking phase, the crew shares
the monitoring task. The commander monitors PNGS altitude and altitude
rate engine T/W, and DPS fuel through the flight instruments. The
systems engineer interrogates the DSKY and DEDA for more precise data
and compares these to the precomputed bounds of the monitored parameters.
In addition, the systems engineer also checks the engine T/W and DPS fuel
and monitors delta V through the AGS. Altitude monitoring with the LR is
relegated to the commander and should occur as early in the descent as
possible for comparison with the PNGS estimate of altitude MSFN provides
the LM with an overall velocity check and establishes earth-LM relative
range-rate for use in guidance system failure isolation.
r•►
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With the exception of altitude, the trajectory variables are velocities.
The use of velocities as a primary check is based on the assumption,
which is reasonable, that if the insertion results in a correct peri-
cynthion state vector and the landing site altitude uncertainty is of
the order predicted in reference 5 CAMS = 544 feet), then a safe
trajectory is assured If the vertical and lateral velocities remain
within their expected 3(7S' limits. In any event, the present traj ectory
almost precludes the use of downrange position or landmarks for monitor-
ing because of the uncertainty in correlating range and time from a
reference trajectory. The downrange uncertainty exists because of the
descent engine calibration during the transfer burn which cannot be
predicted beforehand. Crossrange position should not be affected by
the engine uncertainties, but correct velocity limits mean the out-of-
plane position error is	 within the expected bounds. Altitude is
not required for monitoring early in the descent, but it is a required
check later in the descent, and there is no reason to have a break in
the monitoring procedures, and therefore, is checked to maintain
continuity in the procedure. The monitoring of T/WP fuel, and AV
provides a check on engine performance.
Table 6 shows the upper and lower bounds for some of the monitored
variables during braking. The variables do not need to be more
^.	 accurate than the nearest 500 feet for altitude and the nearest
5 feet/second for altitude rate because of the difficulty in reading
rapidly changing numbers. The times shown for checking are arbitrary
and stop at 400 seconds into the powered descent. In the actual opera-
tional case, a series of charts or nomograms based on the expected
traj ectory and descent engine performance will probably be necessary.
Final Approach and Landing Monitoring - Monitoring of the trajectory
during the braking phase consists of integrating visual cues with the
PNGS traj ectory information. MSFN can still track, but, except for
one AGS check near the half-way mark of the final approach . AGS
monitoring is discontinued because the crew will be too busy with
more important duties. In any event, the crew should be able tc,
evaluate the trajectory performance in this phase better than MSFN
or the AGS. The commander should monitor the flight instruments,
including the LPD and LR. The systems engineer transfers his major
effort toward evaluating the PNGS trajectory data, comparing it with
the LR, and informing the commander of the DSKY/LPD readout. It is
not anticipated that extensive charts containing trajectory data can
be used because of the small time allowed for cross checking and
because of the very likely possibility that a change of landing site
will be made. As long as the final approach trajectory is designed
to be within the capability of the crew to assess the changes as they
occur, visual cues and knowledge of the LPD effects on the trajectory
should be sufficient.
I,r
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PNGS-AGS Trajectory Differencing
The principle operation in guidance monitoring using PNGS-AGS differencing
requires the crew to periodically determine the difference in the PNGS
and AGS estimates of selected variables.	 The difference is then compared
to a chart (table 7) or graph which contains the expected PNGS-AGS differ-
ence for that time in the descent. 	 If the difference is less than the
expected difference, the guidance systems are assumed to be operating
correctly.	 Should the difference be greater than the normally expected
value, one of the two systems is considered to be failed.	 The failed
system is isolated using one of the three independent systems available
for this purpose.
Braking Phase Monitoring - The monitoring of the two systems in this
f technique follows much the same line as for trajectory monitoring.	 The
additional requirement is that the crew must difference the PNGS and AGS
if
estimates of altitude, altitude rate, and lateral velocity at intervals
along the descent.	 The monitoring chart used is shown in Table 7.
	
The
division of responsibility is essentially that of Table 4 with the major
change being the differencing performed by the systems engineer. 	 The
time line of events is contained in Table 5.
Final Approach and Landing Monitoring - Once hi-gate has been reached,
the differencing is discontinued because the time is not available to
perform the check. 	 In any event, it would seem that if a guidance
failure has not been detected by this time in the descent, there is
very small chance of detecting it during the final approach and
landing phase.	 Thus, the monitoring after hi-gate is the same as
that for trajectory monitoring.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the results of this study, the following conclusions are made:
t 1.	 There is a high probability of detecting guidance failures that
lead to unsafe trajectories, but it is still possible to have failures
that cause large guidance errors that are not readily detected by
tra j ectory monitoring.
2.	 Trajectory deviations of the order of W7 must exist for over
300 seconds into the powered descent to cause the W to penetrate the
deadman's curve and deviations of the order of 10(Y must exist for over
430 seconds to cause penetration of the deadman's curve.
3.	 The guidance component failures causing the trajectory deviations
cited in (2) above, except for accelerometer biases, constitute essentially
complete failures of the components.
	
In the case of accelerometer biases,
component deviations of the order of 9(T drive the LM into the deadman's
curve.
II "I
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4. Even under the worstpossible case, the crew has a better than
99.9% chance of detecting all failures leading to unsafe abort conditions
within 100 seconds after tho start of descent burn.
5. Either of the two monitoring techniques examined in this study
provides the crew with a satisfactory method for detecting guidance
system failures; however, the reference trajectory monitoring technique
offers some time advantage over the PNGS-AGS differencing technique and
is more in line with normal piloting procedures.
6. With the present system configuration, there is very little
chance that the crew will be able to identify the failed component
using trajectory monitoring techniques.
7. While the rendezvous radar can be used as a failure isolating
device, it cannot be identified as being an absolute requirement for
guidance monitoring during the IM powered descent to the lunar surface
because the landing radar and MSFN are oach capable of providing the
additional data source required.
REOMMEWDATIONS
The following recommendations are) made:
1. The effect of landing radar update on the error analysis should
be made to obtain more realistic values for the magnitude of failures
that can be detected by the crew.
2. An analysis should be made to determine tbt, full capabilities
of the MSFN during powered descent.
3. A piloted simulation study should be made to evaluate for
guidance monitoring techniques of this report in an operational
environment.
9
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MONITORED BY
VARIABLE COMMANDER SYSTEMS ENGINEER
ALT PNGS-LR AGS-PNGS
ALT RATE PNGS-LR AGS-PNGS
EARTH - LM
RANG BRAT E
MSFN
C RO SSRANG E
VELOCITY PNGS AGS-PNG S
T/W Meter Meter
f^ V AGS
F "el Meter Meter
Fr
Table 4 - Monitored Trajectory Parameters
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Table 5 (Continued)
COMMANDER SY ST EMS ENG I N EEK
TIME (S F)v)
-	 ---- --	 - - -
— --	 --- -	 —^
FA-10 Alines eye with LPD for Verifies PNGS Alt = 7100 feet,
! expected 520 reading Furward velocity = 700 ft/sec
Thrust = 6000C Pitch att = 620
i Alt rate = 145 ft/sec, Lat vel = 0
Calls out trajectory data over
interphone and VHF command
FA-6 Verifies pitch to final
	 - Verifies	 to final approach —^Bitch
approach attitude
- --	 -	 - -- -- -- -- -
----------
att and b /sec att rate
-
FA-0+ Evaluates visibility Verifies pitch angle = 38 °
pro.ilems.	 Performs safety LPD reading = 520 , alt = 6100 feet,
of flight trajectory alt rate = 135 ft/sec, thrust = 5300.
evaluation.	 Begins search Calls out hi-gate event and data
for landing site and aline- over interphone and VHF command.
ment with LPD = 52 0 .	 Starts
assessment of trajectory and
landing site by visual cues.
FA+10 Verifies LPD reading = 52° Calls out LPD reading, altitude,
and LEM is on-trajectory, altitude rate, T/W, and fuel
site good.	 i remaining (interphone only)
FA+20 Continues LPD monitoring Verifies and calls out alt = 381^ feet,
and trajectory and site alt rate = 95 ft/sec, pitch = 38
assessment.	 Visually forward vel = 380 ft/sec, lat
estimates altitude and vel = 0 ft/sec, LPD = 52, thrust =
evaluates altitude rate 5100#, fuel =
against values called out
by systems engineer.
FA+30 Verifies LPD = 52° and	 i Calls out LPD reading alt and
on-trajectory alt rate (interphone only).
FA+40	 Continues visual LFD 	 Verifies and calls out over
monitoring and trajectory	 interphone and VHF command
and site assessment checks	 alt = 2500 feet, alt rate = 65 ft/sec,
pitci_ = 380 , forward vel = 260 ft/sec
Lat vel = 0 ft/sec, LPD = 52,
thruit 4700#, Fuel =
SY ST WS I!NG I N hn
Checks AGS alt =
alt rate =
Calls out LPD, alt, alt rate
(interphone only)
Verifies alt = 1200 feet,
alt rate = 35 ft/sec, pitch = 350
for vel = 140 ft/seep LPD = 520
lat Val = 0 ft/sec, thr.ist = 4200#
Verifies and calls out over
phone alt = 800 feet,
alt rate = 25 ft sec, pitch = 32°
for vel = 90 ft^ec, thrust = 4000#
Switches PNGS from AUTO to RCAH,
manually. Verifies fuel quantity
level is satisfactory and relates
this to Commander.
Calls out to-gate over VHF command
and interphone. Monitors flight
instruments and begins terrain
assessment from right-hand window
Checks fuel status. Advises
commander of landing site
assessment.
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Table 5 (Continuod)
r
riAI E
	- - -- coMMANDFR
FA+50	 Verifies visually LPD = 520
and that trajectory and
site good.
FA+60	 Verifies LPD = 520 rind
continues trajectory and
site assessment.
I Ft70	 Verifies LPD = 52° and
trajectory and site are
good.
F+75	 Rotates UN from 30° to
pitch back attitude.
Switches LR to second
position.
L+0	 Evaluates vehicles handling
qualities. Verifies+ pitch
att = 11 0 , alt = 500 feet,
alt rate = 15 ft/sec, l.at
vel = 0, for vel = 50 ft/sec
Verifies landing site
satisfactory.
L+10	 Verifies pitch att = 11°
alt = 350 feet, alt rate =
15 ft/sec, for vel = 40 ft/soc
Checks landing site. Reduces
alt rate to 8 ft/sec
Evaluates performance of
rate-of-descent command
mode. Estimates engine
gimbal an le (roll attitude
for zero Y )
L+62
r
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Table 5 (Concluded)
PM E
Srrc
L+ 30
SY ST 94S kNG I N EER
Advises Commander of fuel status.
COMMANDER
Verifies pitch att = 110
alt = 190 feet, for vel =
20 ft/sec, lat = 0.
Reduces lat rate to 5
ft/sec. Checks landing 	 I
site. Evaluates
performance of rate-of-
descent command mode.
Estimates gimbal angle
(roll).
L+40
1.+45
_. - -,
Landing site passes from	 Advises Commander of landing site,
view. Alt = 140 feet	 fuel status.
alt rate = 5 ft/sec
forward vel. = 10 ft/sec
lat vel = 0
Checks for dust agitation.
Begins rotation forward and M Checks for final radar update of
nulls forward and lateral
	
FNGC^.
--velocities. ---- --- - -- -._. . .1	 - —
L+50
L+60
L+70
Continues to null forward
and lateral velocities.
Notes alt = 90 feet,
alt rate = 5 ft/sec.
Checks fuel. Compares
forward and lateral
velocity null visually.
Estimates pitch and
roll component of engine
g'.mbal angle.
Continues velocity nulling.
Notes alt = 40 feet. Checks
fuel. Estimates pitch and
roll component of engine
gimbal angle.
Continues velocity nu-Lling.
Notes alt = 30 feet, reduces
alt rate to 4 ft/sec. Arms
DE shutoff switch.
Shuts off DE on probe light
indication
Advises Commander of fuel
Continues advisement.
Continues advisement	 i
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Figure 3 - Effect of T/W Ratio on Deadman's Curve Penetration
